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Abstract
We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance
constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions
are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of e¢ cient allocation
of risk.
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In many applications of mechanism design, a key aspect of the implementation problem is to
ensure that the budget is balanced. For example, when mechanisms are designed for the provision
of public goods, the contributions need to cover the costs of producing the good. In bilateral trade,
the buyer￿ s payment needs to equal the seller￿ s revenue. In the dissolution of partnerships, the
transfers must add up to zero.
If there is a risk neutral lender with su¢ cient liquidity available, who does not otherwise par-
ticipate in the mechanism, budget balance is most naturally imposed as an ex ante constraint. If
resources are balanced in expectation, the outside lender is willing and able to o⁄er an insurance
contract to the mechanism designer that guarantees a zero de￿cit in every state of the world. How-
ever, in some applications, such as the bilateral trade example, the assumption of a risk neutral
outsider seems to run counter to the spirit of the model. In such cases it appears more natural to
require that the budget is balanced ex post.
Ex post budget balance tends to be analytically less tractable than ex ante budget balance.
Fortunately, in many settings one can show that the restrictions are equivalent in the sense that
an ex ante balanced mechanism can be transformed into an ex post balanced mechanism without
upsetting the incentive constraints, and without changing the allocation rule. That is, payments
are rearranged, but ￿real￿decisions are una⁄ected. These sort of results appear in two di⁄erent
versions. In one version participation constraints are either absent, or they are imposed ex ante, so
that agents must choose whether to participate behind the veil of ignorance. In another version,
participation constraints are interim, so that agents can still opt out after learning their types.
The literature that does not impose interim participation constraints goes back to the seminal
contributions by d￿ Aspremont and GØrard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). A concise summary of
this work can be found in d￿ Aspremont, CrØmer and GØrard-Varet (2004). This literature provides
a more or less complete characterization for when it is possible to implement an e¢ cient decision
rule and when it possible to implement any decision rule, while maintaining a balanced budget in
any state of the world.
For the case of interim participation constraints a result that guarantees the existence of an
equivalent ex post budget balanced mechanism for any ex ante budget balanced mechanism has
2been obtained in some special contexts, such as bilateral trade (Myerson and Satterthwaite￿ s, 1983,
Theorem 1), resolution of partnerships (Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer￿ s, 1987, Lemma 4) and
public goods (Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990, Theorem 1). All these special results concern the case
of independent types. For the case with correlated types, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1995) and
Kosenok and Severinov (2002) have provided a general result that holds under generic conditions
on the type distribution.
This focus of this paper is on the case of independent types. The purpose of the paper is twofold.
Firstly, we point out that independence of types guarantees equivalence between ex ante and ex
post budget balance with interim participation constraints not just in the special cases covered by
the literature so far, but in general. Secondly, our proof provides a simple interpretation of this
result in terms of e¢ cient, incentive compatible, and interim individually rational allocation of risk.
That is, we begin the analysis by asking when a risk averse agent and a set of partially informed
risk neutral agents can agree on an e¢ cient risk sharing agreement. Whenever this is possible, it
follows more or less immediately that, regardless of the details of the implementation problem, ex
ante and ex post budget balance are equivalent.
To obtain some intuition for our result, note ￿rst that we assume, as most of the literature
does, that agents have additively separable preferences, are risk neutral in transfers, and have no
liquidity constraints. Thus, in principle, the agents are able and willing to provide insurance to the
mechanism designer just as an outside lender would be. However, the insurance scheme is agreed
upon after agents observe their private information, implying that it must give all agents￿incentives
to participate and to report their private observations truthfully. These problems can be resolved if
agents￿private signals are independent. The scheme used in the proof designates one of the agents,
the ￿primary insurer￿ , to provide insurance for the budget de￿cit in as far as it is not predictable on
the basis of this agent￿ s own signal. Some other agent, the ￿secondary insurer￿ , provides insurance
for the part of the budget de￿cit that can be predicted using the ￿rst agent￿ s signal. The role of
the independence assumption is to ensure that truth-telling is incentive compatible for the primary
insurer and that the participation constraints hold for the secondary insurer.
We also show that the same idea can be used to obtain a weaker result in the case when there
exist two types with conditionally independent signals, a condition that ￿rst appeared in CrØmer
and Riordan (1985). Then, we can guarantee that participation constraints are satis￿ed for all but
3a single agent.1
Our paper is most closely related to d￿ Aspremont, CrØmer and GØrard-Varet (2004). While they
focus on ￿rst best e¢ cient mechanisms and do not consider the implications of interim participation
constraints, the insurance scheme that we consider is the same as a construction used in one of
their proofs.2 Our contribution may thus be viewed as clarifying that, in a slightly more general
setting than theirs, this construction preserves interim incentives to participate, and to provide an
explanation based on elementary insurance theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider an insurance
problem with privately informed insurance providers. We then use the analysis of the insurance
problem to prove our main result in Section 3 for the case that agents￿signals are independent. In
Section 4 we prove the extension with the weakened independence assumption. Section 5 contains
some further discussion of the literature.
2 The Insurance Problem
Consider a risk-averse agent facing some uncertain expenditure (or income) that depends on N
random variables ~ si where i 2 I = f1;2;:::;Ng. For i 2 I denote by si 2 Si a generic realization of
the i-th random variable, and de￿ne s ￿ (s1;s2;:::;sN) and S ￿ ￿N
i=1Si. The expenditure that the
risk averse agent faces is a function x : S ! R.
From textbook economic theory we know that if there exists a risk neutral agent who is not
privately informed about s, this agent is willing to fully insure the risk averse agent at an actuarially
fair rate. This would generate an ex ante Pareto e¢ cient allocation. No such uninformed risk
neutral agent is available in our setup. Instead, there are N partially informed risk neutral agents,
where for each positive integer i ￿ N, the risk neutral agent i knows the realization si at the time
at which the risk averse agent seeks to purchase insurance.3
De￿nition 1 An insurance contract is a pair hp;mi; where p 2 RN and m : S ! RN.
1This result is a slight generalization of the main result in CrØmer and Riordan (1985), where the added generality
is that it applies to arbitrary allocation rules rather than the surplus maximizing rule.
2See part (i) of the proof of Theorem 2 d￿ Aspremont, CrØmer and GØrard-Varet (2004).
3It is without loss of generality to assume away any ￿residual uncertainty￿in addition to s, since such uncertainty
can be insured away as a ￿rst step of the analysis.
4We write p = (p1;p2;:::;pN) for what can be interpreted as up-front payments and adopt the
convention that a positive pi is a transfer to agent i: Similarly, we write m(s) = (m1(s);:::;mN(s))
and treat a positive value mi(s) as a transfer from i to the agent that seeks insurance.
An insurance contract provides full insurance if the payments by the N agents cover the un-
certain expenditure. It is actuarially fair if the up-front payments equal the expected expenditure.
We consider two incentive constraints. The ￿rst is non-manipulability. This requires that truthful
reporting of the signals by the N agents is a Bayesian equilibrium. The second condition is interim
individual rationality. We imagine that each agent i observes her signal si, but not that of any
other agent, before signing the insurance contract, and that agents cannot be forced to sign the
contract. All agents must therefore earn a weakly positive expected pro￿t in order to be willing
to accept the contract.
To formalize the four properties listed in the previous paragraph, we will assume that all relevant
expectations are well-de￿ned and let E[zjy] denote the expected value of z conditional on y.
De￿nition 2 An insurance contract hp;mi




for every s 2 S;










￿ is non-manipulable if
E[mi(si; ~ s￿i)jsi] ￿ E[mi(^ si; ~ s￿i)jsi]
for each i 2 I and all si; ^ si 2 Si;
￿ is interim individually rational if
pi ￿ E[mi(~ s)jsi]
for each i 2 I and si 2 Si.
5If the set of signals Si is discrete, non-manipulability is a consequence of interim individually
rationality and actuarial fairness.4 In general, individual rationality and actuarial fairness guarantee
that non-manipulability is satis￿ed for almost all pairs (si; ^ si), but may fail on a set of measure
zero. Since non-manipulability fails if just a single type earns a higher payo⁄ than all others, we
need the de￿nition in general.
Proposition 1 relies on the following condition.
(IND) The random variables ~ s1; ~ s2;:::; ~ sN are independent.
We are now ready to state the result:
Proposition 1 If (IND) holds and N ￿ 2, then there exist insurance contracts that are interim
individually rational, provide full insurance, are actuarially fair, and are non-manipulable. More-
over, for any i;j 2 I with i 6= j, there is some such insurance contracts that has the property that
agent j￿ s payment does not depend on his type, and that agents other than agents i and j make zero
payments in all states.
Proof: Take as the starting point an insurance scheme where pi = E[x(~ s)], mi(s) = x(s), and
where pk = mk(s) = 0 for all k 6= i and s 2 S: That is, agent i provides full insurance at an
actuarially fair rate and all other agents are inactive. The problem with this scheme is that it will
in general fail individually rationality and non-manipulability, since x(s) in general varies in si:
But, since si is independent from s￿i, the obvious solution to this problem is to pick some other
agent, agent j in the statement of Proposition 1, to insure agent i against the variability in si:
To make this idea formal, we consider the following decomposition of x(s).




E[x(si; ~ s￿i) j si] ￿ E[x(~ s)]
| {z }
Deviation of conditional expected value from unconditional expected value
+
x(s) ￿ E[x(si; ~ s￿i) j si]
| {z }
Deviation of realization from conditional expected value
The idea of the insurance contract constructed below is that one agent, whom we label agent 1,
pays for the ￿rst and third term in the above decomposition. The second term is paid by someone
4This is seen by using the law of iterated expectations in the de￿nition of actuarial fairness.
6else, whom we label as agent 2. These two agents are compensated by appropriate up-front lump
sum payments, and all other agents pay nothing. Formally, let hp￿;m￿i be given by,
p￿
1 = E[x(~ s)]
m￿








for every k ￿ 3 and every s 2 S.
It is obvious by construction that hp￿;m￿i provides full insurance, is actuarially fair, and that
non-manipulability is trivially satis￿ed for each agent k ￿ 3. Moreover, agent 2￿ s payment is
independent of his report, so non-manipulability needs only to be checked for is agent 1. If agent
1 observes signal realization s1 but reports ^ s1, her expected payment is:
E[x(~ s)] + E[x(^ s1; ~ s￿1)js1] ￿ E[x(^ s1; ~ s￿1)j^ s1] = E[x(~ s)];
where the equality follows the independence assumption (IND). Since the expected payment,
E[x(~ s)]; is independent of the report b s1, there is no incentive for 1 to manipulate the contract.
It remains to check interim individual rationality. This holds trivially for agents k ￿ 3, and the
above calculation demonstrates that it is satis￿ed for agent 1. Agent 2￿ s interim expected payment
is:
E[E[x(~ s1; ~ s￿1j~ s1]js2]] ￿ E[~ x(s)]:
By (IND), the ￿rst and the second term are identical. The interim expected payment for agent 2
is thus zero, implying that the individual rationality condition is satis￿ed. The claim in the second
sentence of Proposition 2 follows by relabeling of the agents.
Q.E.D.
The proof of Proposition 1 uses an insurance contract where one actor, agent 1, acts as a
￿primary insurer￿ , and a second actor, agent 2, insures the primary insurer against the variation
that can be predicted by agent 1. One can construct alternative contracts in which the role of
the primary insurer is divided arbitrarily between the N agents, and in which the role to provide
7secondary insurance for i is divided arbitrarily among the remaining N ￿ 1 agents. Formally, let
￿ 2 RN be a vector which may be thought of as ￿primary insurance weights￿in that we require
that
P
i ￿i = 1; but where a particular ￿i need not be nonnegative. In the same way, for each
i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, let ￿i 2 RN￿1 be a vector of ￿secondary insurance weights￿ , that is the shares
in the insurance against the variation that can be predicted by i. Again,
P
j6=i ￿ij = 1, but a
particular ￿ij need not be nonnegative. Now, for each i 2 I and every s 2 S let:
p￿
i = ￿iE[x(~ s)]
m￿




￿ji￿j (E[x(sj; ~ s￿j) j sj] ￿ E[x(~ s)]):
We leave it to the reader to verify that an insurance scheme of this form provides full insurance,
and is actuarially fair, non-manipulable, and interim individually rational. However, it obviously
does not have the properties referred to in the second sentence of Proposition 1.
3 Ex Ante and Ex Post Budget Balance
Assume again that there are N agents i 2 I = f1;2;:::;Ng. They have to choose one decision
a from a set A of possible collective decisions. Each agent i privately receives a signal ~ si with
realizations in Si. We now interpret ~ si as agent i￿ s type. Preferences are de￿ned over A and a
numØraire good called ￿money￿ . Let ti 2 R be the transfer of money from agent i. Each agent i
has a quasi-linear von Neumann Morgenstern utility given by
ui(a;s) ￿ ti
where ui : A￿S ! R. As in the previous section, each agent observes si; but remains uninformed
about s￿i. Finally, there is a resource constraint: implementing decision a 2 A costs r(a;s) 2 R
units of the numØraire good.
Note the generality of our model. Each agent i￿ s signal potentially a⁄ects agent i￿ s and other
agents￿preferences as well as the resource requirements.
De￿nition 3 A mechanism is a pair hf;ti, where
8￿ f : S ! A is the allocation rule. For every s 2 S the decision f(s) is implemented when s is
announced.
￿ t : S ! RN is the payment rule. We de￿ne t(s) = (t1(s);t2(s);:::; tN(s)), and for every i 2 I
and s 2 S the value ti(s) is the transfer from agent i when s is announced.
By the revelation principle it is without loss of generality that we restrict attention to direct
mechanisms in which agents announce their types. For simplicity of notation, we only consider pure
direct revelation mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that pick some alternative in A with probability
1, conditional on the agents￿announcements, but our argument is easily extendable to the case of
random decisions.
De￿nition 4 A mechanism hf;ti is












It now follows almost immediately from Proposition 1 that the set of allocation rules that can
be implemented under ex post budget balance and under ex ante budget balance are related in the
way described in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 Suppose (IND) holds and N ￿ 2. For every ex ante budget balanced mechanism
hf;ti, and for any two agents i;j 2 I with i 6= j, there is an ex post budget balanced mechanism
h ^ f;^ ti such that:
￿ The allocation rule is unchanged:
^ f(s) = f(s) for every s 2 S;
￿ The interim expected payments by agents i and j are unchanged:
E[^ tk(sk; ~ s￿k) j sk] = E[tk(sk; ~ s￿k) j sk] for every k 2 fi;jg and every sk 2 Sk;
9￿ The change in agent j￿ s payment does not depend on agent j￿ s signal:
^ tj(sj;s￿j) ￿ tj(sj;s￿j) = ^ tj(s0
j;s￿j) ￿ tj(s0
j;s￿j) for any sj;s0
j 2 Sj;
￿ The payment rule for agents other than i and j is unchanged:
^ tk(s) = t(s) for every k 2 I with k 6= i;j and for every s 2 S.
Proof: Consider a mechanism hf;ti that is ex ante budget balanced. For every state s 2 S de￿ne




That is, x(s) is the ex post de￿cit under the proposed mechanism. We know from Proposition
1 that there exist insurance contracts that provide full insurance for the de￿cit x, and have the
properties listed in Proposition 1. Let hp;mi be one such contract. Non-manipulability implies
that for every i 2 I there exists some real number ki such that pi ￿ E[mi(si; ~ s￿i) j si] = ki for
every si 2 Si. To satisfy interim individual rationality, ki must be weakly positive, and if any ki
were strictly larger than 0 a violation of actuarial fairness would be implied. We conclude that
pi ￿ E￿i[mi(s) j si] = 0 for every i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng and every si 2 Si:
Now consider the transfer scheme ^ t where
^ ti(s) = ti(s) ￿ pi + mi(s)
for every i 2 I and s 2 S. Interim expected payments are unchanged for every i 2 Si by the
earlier calculation. As the scheme provides full insurance, the mechanism with allocation rule f
and transfer rule ^ t is ex post budget balanced. The last two bullet points in Proposition 2 follow
from the fact that hp;mi has the properties listed in the second sentence of Proposition 1.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 does not require either incentive compatibility or individual rationality. However,
if truth telling is a Bayesian equilibrium in the original mechanism (with interim participation
constraints imposed), the same holds true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism. Moreover,
if for any of the agents other than agent i, truth telling was a dominant strategy in the original
mechanism, the same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism. Finally, if the original
mechanism satis￿ed an interim individual rationality constraint for any agent, then the same will
be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism.
104 An Extension
We now relax the independence condition (IND). Unfortunately, the conclusion that we then obtain
is slightly weaker than the conclusion of Proposition 1, as one of the agents￿interim individual
rationality constraint may be violated for some realizations of this agent￿ s signal. The weaker
condition that we are considering is called ￿Condition S￿in CrØmer and Riordan (1985).5 We call
it (CIND).
(CIND) There are two agents i;j 2 I, where i 6= j, such that conditional on every realization of
the other agents￿signals, the signals ~ si and ~ sj of agents i and j are independent.
Condition (CIND) implies that N ￿ 2, so Proposition 3, unlike Proposition 1, does not explicitly
mention this condition.
Proposition 3 Let i and j be two agents for whom condition (CIND) holds. Then there are
insurance contracts that provide full insurance, are actuarially fair, are non-manipulable, and that
satisfy the interim individually rationality condition except possibly for agent j. Moreover, agent j￿ s
payment does not depend on his type, and all agents other than agents i and j make zero payments
in all states.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that agents 1;2 are two agents for whom (CIND) is
satis￿ed. We write s￿12 for realizations of the random variable ~ s￿12 ￿ (~ sk)N
k=3 and observe that.




E[x(s1; ~ s2;s￿12)js1;s￿12] ￿ E[x(~ s)]
| {z }
Deviation of conditional expected value from unconditional expected value
+
x(s) ￿ E[x(s1; ~ s2;s￿12)js1;s￿12]
| {z }
Deviation of realization from conditional expected value
As in the proof of Proposition 1, the idea of the insurance contract hp￿;m￿i that we construct is
that the ￿rst and the third component in the above decomposition will be agent i￿ s payment. The
second component will be agent j￿ s payment. Agent 1 is compensated by an up-front payment.
5We comment below on the relation between our results in this section and CrØmer and Riordan￿ s main result.
11Agent 2￿ s expected payment will be shown to be zero, and therefore he needs no up-front payment.
All other agents￿payments equal zero in all states, and they receive no up-front payment. That is,
p￿
1 = E[x(~ s)]
m￿








for all k ￿ 3 and all s 2 S.
This contract obviously provides full insurance and is actuarially fair. Non-manipulability is
trivially satis￿ed for each agent K ￿ 3; and since the payment is independent of his report, non-
manipulability is also satis￿ed for agent 2. It remains to check it for agent 1. Suppose agent 1 has
observed signal realization s1, and reports signal realization ^ s1. Then his expected payment is:
E[x(~ s)] + E[x(^ s1; ~ s2; ~ s￿12)js1] ￿ E[E[x(^ s1; ~ s2; ~ s￿12)j^ s1; ~ s￿12] j s1]:
By the law of iterated expectations, the second term can be re-written as
E[x(^ s1; ~ s2; ~ s￿12)js1] = E[E[x(^ s1; ~ s2; ~ s￿12)js1; ~ s￿12]js1]
= E[E[x(^ s1; ~ s2; ~ s￿12)j^ s1; ~ s￿12]js1];
where the second inequality follows from the conditional independence assumption (CIND). Thus,
the second and third term in 1￿ s expected payment cancel each other out, implying that the expected
payment is E[x(~ s)] for any report ^ s1 2 S1: Hence, non-manipulability is satis￿ed for agent 1 as well.
Individual rationality obviously holds for agents other than agents 1 and 2. It also holds for
agent 1, by the above calculation. Finally, the insurance contract obviously has the properties
referred to in the second sentence of Proposition 3.
Q.E.D.
In the same way in which Proposition 2 followed from Proposition 1, we can now deduce from
Proposition 3:
Proposition 4 Let i and j be two agents for whom condition (CIND) holds. For every ex ante
budget balanced mechanism hf;ti there is an ex post budget balanced mechanism h ^ f;^ ti such that:
12￿ The allocation rule is unchanged:
^ f(s) = f(s) for every s 2 S;
￿ The interim expected payment by agent i is unchanged:
E[^ ti(si; ~ s￿i) j si] = E[ti(si; ~ s￿i) j si] for every si 2 Si;
￿ The change in agent j￿ s payment does not depend on agent j￿ s signal:
^ tj(sj;s￿j) ￿ tj(sj;s￿j) = ^ tj(s0
j;s￿j) ￿ tj(s0
j;s￿j) for any sj;s0
j 2 Sj;
￿ The payment rule for agents other than i and j is unchanged:
^ tk(s) = t(s) for every k 2 I with k = 2 fi;jg and for every s 2 S.
Like Proposition 2, also Proposition 4 is true regardless of whether incentive compatibility or
individual rationality are satis￿ed or not. However, if truth telling is a Bayesian equilibrium in
the original mechanism, then the same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism.
Moreover, if for any of the agents other than agent i, truth telling was a dominant strategy in the
original mechanism, the same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism. Finally, if
the original mechanism satis￿ed an interim individual rationality constraint for any agent, then the
same will be true in the ex post budget balanced mechanism, except possibly for agent j.
An implication of Proposition 4 is as follows. Consider the case that there are private values,
i.e. every agent￿ s utility depends only on his own type, but not on the other agents￿types. Suppose
also that the resource costs are a linear function of agents types: r(a;s) = ￿ r+
PN
i=1 ri(a;si). Let f￿
be an allocation rule that maximizes social surplus, i.e. the sum of utilities minus resource costs,
in every state. A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule will ensure that truthful reporting of type
is a dominant strategy. By adding appropriate constants, we can ensure that the mechanism is ex
ante budget balanced. By Proposition 4 we can then construct another payment scheme that is
ex post budget balanced, that makes for N ￿ 1 agents truth telling a dominant strategy, and that
has the property that for the remaining agent truth telling is expected utility maximizing provided
that all other agents tell the truth. This is Theorem 2 in CrØmer and Riordan (1985). Proposition
4 above strengthens CrØmer and Riordan￿ s result because it applies not only to surplus maximizing
allocation rules but to other allocation rules as well.
135 Discussion
The paper that is closest to ours is d￿ Aspremont, CrØmer and GØrard-Varet (2004). They prove
that, in the absence of interim participation constraints, e¢ cient decision rules can always be
implemented if, for every real-valued function r(s); there exists a transfer rule t : such that
P
i ti (s) = r(s) for every s and









for every agent i and every pair si;s0
i 2 Si: In our language this condition is simply saying that
for every uncertain expenditure that the mechanism designer might have there exists an incentive
compatible full insurance agreement between the agents and the mechanism designer. While the
condition it is not expressed in terms of primitives, there are several known su¢ cient conditions,
one being stochastic independence (see d￿ Aspremont, CrØmer and GØrard-Varet, 2004).
For the case when types are correlated, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1995) and Kosenok
and Severinov (2002) have shown that large sets of allocation rules can be implemented by interim
individually rational and ex post budget balanced mechanisms under very general conditions. These
results rely, though, on the logic of the full surplus extraction results in CrØmer and McLean
(1985, 1988) and McA⁄ee and Reny (1992). As has been pointed out by Neeman (2004), such
results hinge crucially on preferences being uniquely determined by beliefs, an assumption which
is possible to relax while still allowing for correlations. Qualitatively, breaking the one-to-one
correspondence between beliefs and preferences results in a model more similar to the (non-generic)
case with stochastic independence in the sense that informational asymmetries become relevant.
Our approach to ex ante versus ex post budget balance may therefore be useful in this case.
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